Max Weber's work still spotlights -quite accurately- the significance of a society's deepest taken for granted loyalties. I do not mean to tribe, ethnicity, or religion but to an all-encompassing way of thinking that legitimates tradition or charisma rather than law; incompetence rather than a skill set developed though education, experience and commitment to shared professional standards.

   This is an old problem. Think of Richard Glover's Peninsular Preparation, a book about Reform of the British Army in the late nineteenth century. By definition officers were aristocrats, so bound by traditional authority that a sergeant actually whispered the words of command into an officer's ear when he drilled his troops. Aristocrats never learned such necessary knowledge; that info belonged to the rank and file, all commanded  by hopeless officers and their retinue of servants, fine food and a string of useless yet prestigious horses.

   England changed. America's predicament is that when we most need a determined  commitment to law, reason and competence, we face in Yemen and Afghanistan societies that remain deeply dedicated to traditional beliefs, values and practices. In laying out plans to transform everything from the police, to the army, to the political system, American policy makers confidently proclaim goals and the means to attain them. In military briefings the computer based Power Point slides look like a puzzle that is already solved. Here is what we are going to do; and here is how we are going the do it. We will of course encounter resistance from Yemen and Afghanistan but they will ultimately bow to common sense and accept the changes that make law and competence the order of the day.

    This is nonsense. As if Humpty Dumpty, Yemen and Afghanistan are fractured by religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties, all rooted in  a passionate, even sacred commitment to tradition. As with England's army in 1800, changing these societies requires a willing constituency, not to mention a century or more of effort. The problem is that we want change yesterday, we are not going to get it and that raises the question of whether we are squandering lives and treasure in a fruitless effort to square the circle.

   Consider a New York Times article (dated January 4th, 2010) about the nature of Yemen's government. Steven Erlanger writes that "the government is practically caged in the capital". In the rest of  Yemen traditional tribal and religious loyalties rule the day, while President Ali Abdullah Saleh fills the most important government posts with one family member after another. This guarantees a modicum of loyalty but if the issue is competence and a commitment to law, the gap between the Power Point slides and the Yemeni countryside is as wide as the 550 mile Gulf of Aden.

    Here is a question. Perhaps, instead of trying to change societies that could be resisting us in 2110, America should focus its efforts on what is actually under its aegis and possibilities? Read, for example, the White House review of the December 25th, 2009 attack by Mr. Abdulmutallab and a reader is struck by the incompetence of our highly educated, well trained CIA and State Department officials. Close to a decade after 9/11 no one "connected the dots" even though the information was readily available. We blew it and changing the nature of the organizations and personnel responsible for these failures is something we can actually effectuate. Similarly, if protecting the home front is the goal, we also have the power -and presumably the will- to train and provide airport personnel with a professional commitment to the highest standards, all efforts assisted by the latest technology.

   Unfortunately, a commitment to traditional authority is only part of our problem in nations like Yemen and Afghanistan. Weber also wrote about charismatic authority and one of its most peculiar attributes: The charismatic figure could be dead! Think Jesus or Mohammed. That's trouble enough but as Marc Sageman explains in Leaderless Jihad the Internet makes it quite easy for potential terrorists to identify with the charismatic authority of an individual they never met.  In silent and secret commitments established via computer screens, potential terrorists attach themselves to individuals who -however bizarre to the rest of us- are treated as "though endowed with supernatural, super human or at least specifically exceptional qualities." Ultimately a person uses the very latest technology to obey orders from a type of authority that is, if not irrational, at least not rational.

   In response, we have the admirable and effective efforts of organizations like the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point or the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Especially at West Point, analysts have tried to understand the nature of an Internet threat over which we actually have some control. With its Islamic Imagery Project, the West Point Center rightfully stresses that "visual imagery provides a key aspect of the terrorists’ message in that it allows these groups to paint a picture of their objectives, their enemies, and their strategy through graphics, photographs, and symbols." 

     In trying to explain what is actually going on the Center offers policy makers the tools required to counter the appeal of charismatic and traditional authorities. For example, to many Americans Bin Laden seems to have a strange and peculiar affinity for caves. But, as the Center stresses, recall that Mohammed made many of his most important pronouncements from a cave and Bin Laden is identifying with the traditional symbols that must be understood by anyone trying to effectively counter his appeal.

   The Center's efforts suggest what American power can achieve. In fact, instead of butting our heads against the stone wall of tradition, perhaps we need to look at ourselves and the failures we could have prevented. For example, months before the invasion of Iraq the U.S. Army War College published a superb study about what not to do in a subsequent occupation. In No End in Sight, Charles Ferguson writes that while the report reached the White House, it was ignored by everybody from the President to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Ultimately looters literally stripped Iraq of everything imaginable and we paid a huge price for failing to listen to the professional advice that was actually available.

    So, as with the President's review of Mr. Abdulmutallab's attack, perhaps we should spend far less time trying to transform intrinsically resistant societies and more time trying to understand why, even when our professionals provide the necessary information, we consistently fail to "connect the dots".

   Tongue in cheek, Weber might even suggest that we need to reinvigorate the professional standards that are not outside the limits of American power.

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